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Listed companies in Hong Kong













HK family controlled 
companies





Major concerns in family-controlled 
companies:
 Appropriation of assets (2008(7); 2009(3): see 2010 APEC 
E i  P li  R t)conom c o cy epor
 Privatization
 Lack of internal control
Solutions:
 Regulation on connected transactions
 Headcount test 




Major concerns in PRC SOEs
 Independence of enterprises from state
 Monitoring performance
 Managerial abuses
 Conflicting objectives of enterprises
Solutions:
 Use of supervisory board
 Use of Independent directors
 Derivative suits
+
Independent directors in HK
 Requirement of ID raised from 2 to 3 in 2004
 Current proposal to increase to 1/3
Board size and number of ID: http://webb-
site.com/dbpub/boardcomp.asp






 Number of Independent directorship held per person: 
http://webb-site.com/dbpub/INEDHKDistnPeople.asp
 Low pay
 Not giving enough time
+
Proper Role of ID?
 Should ID act as consultant to board/company?
 Watchdog for all shareholders against managerial abuses?




Shareholder participation in board 
nomination
 Can give notice of intention to nominate
 Normally board nominates
 Rare example: David Webb nominated by shareholders to be 
ID of HKEx
 Nomination and voting by CCASS not conducive to 
shareholder participation
+
Code of Corporate Governance
 Rules (Compulsory)
 Code Provision (comply or explain)
 Recommended Best Practice (voluntary)
 99% (2009) and 98% (2007) of listed companies complied 
with 41 or more of the 45 CPs.




Consultation Paper (Dec 2010)
 Moving some RBP to CP (eg director training requirement, 
nomination committee) 
 Moving some CP to Rules (eg ID should constitute 1/3 of 
board).  
 Also proposed new rules or CP, eg maximum number of ID a 
person can hold, terms of reference for CG committee, 
disclosing attendance record of directors by name  ,
 New RBP, eg establishment of CG Committee, whistle 
blowing policy. 
+
Main problems with Code
 Lack of enforcement
 Weak punishment (private censure, public criticism)
 Current proposals: extending Market Misconduct Law (under 
Securities and Futures Ordinance) to breach of listing rules 
and Code. 
 Phase 1: only some areas will be extended, eg disclosure 
requirements and connected transactions in Listing Rules, but 
not the Code.
